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The minority game is an important model of complex adaptive systems. The 
reason is that it is simple, yet its rich behaviour provides a key to understand 
various features in a system consisting of competing agents. Therefore, it has 
attracted much attention from researchers in the field of statistical physics 
and econophysics. In this thesis we will first review the basic model of the 
minority game (MG), and then propose and study three variations on the MG 
in which the agents are modified in different ways so as to make the model 
more realistic. The modifications include (i) giving the agents a chance to leave 
the market temporarily, and (ii) setting restrictions on information regarding 
the agents' performance. The models will be established, new features will be 
presented and discussed. Besides, we will also study mixed-population games 
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The topics in this thesis belong to a newly established multidisciplinary field 
called Econophysics [1]. Before giving an outline to the thesis, I will briefly 
introduce the establishment and development of this rapidly growing field. 
Traditionally, economists are the people who study financial and economic 
systems. Besides them, mathematicians also showed great interests in these 
areas. In 1900, Bachelier, a French mathematician, became a pioneer among 
mathematicians in studying economic problems [1]. In his doctoral thesis, 
he studied the pricing of options in speculative markets using the concept of 
random walk [2]. Since then, many mathematicians investigated the statistical 
features in stock prices and pricing problems in derivatives. Mandelbrot, who 
developed the idea of fractals, proposed a hypothesis that the price changes in 
stock market can be described by a Levy distribution [3]. Another important 
piece of work is the Black & Scholes option pricing model in 1973 [4 . 
For physicists, the pioneering work in economics dated back to 1942. In 
that year, Majorana finished a paper which drew an analogy between statisti-
cal physics and social sciences [5]. However, this had not led to much work by 
physicists in the subject, until the following changes in physics and economics 
occured. In the past 30 years physicists have made much progress in areas 
like statistical mechanics and nonlinear dynamics. Many concepts and tools 
have been established to investigate complex systems. On the other hand, 
1 
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electronic trading was employed in foreign exchange markets in the 1980s [1 . 
This development allowed high-frequency financial data to be recorded and 
stored. In a few years abundant amount of financial numerical data became 
available. These data can be used easily since they are stored electronically. 
The availability of good quality data of financial markets soon attracted the 
attention of many physicists. They found that financial markets are interest-
ing complex systems, and are good places to test their concepts and tools. 
Therefore, more physicists are involved in the research in financial and eco-
nomics systems since 1990s. They have brought with them many concepts 
that are new to economics such as universality, scaling, chaos, self-organized 
systems, spin and quantum field theory. Many related papers are published, 
new interdisciplinary journals and conferences are organized. A community of 
physicists who work on problems in finance and economics, is growing, and 
the term "Econophysics" is given to this growing field. The physicists in this 
field not only give new insights to economics problems, but also help many 
financial firms to deal with practical issues such as risk management. 
There are two main approaches for research in econophysics [1]. The first 
one deals with the statistical features of financial data, and the second one is 
to search for models of financial markets. For the first approach, physicists 
analyse the time-series of prices in financial markets. They treat the price 
changes as the result of some underlying stochastic process and want to uncover 
as much statistical features of the data as they could. One of the important 
works is by Stanley et al [6]. They analysed the time series of S&P500 index 
over 13 years and found that the price changes follow a "fat-tailed" distribution 
7, 8]. For the second approach, physicists try to develop theoretical models to 
simulate real markets. These models should demonstrate the essential features 
that are observed in the markets. Economists have also worked on this topic. 
Their traditional theories, for example game theory, assume all traders to be 
deductive in nature: they have complete information of the market; they are 
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equally intelligent; they are perfectly rational that each of them knows what 
his best action is [9]. However, it is soon realised that real traders in real 
markets are more close to be inductive: they do not know much about the 
markets; they are not equally intelligent; they have bounded rationality; and 
quite often they decide their actions by trial and error [9] which is essentially 
a learning process from their experience. Under the standard framwork of 
game theory, Weibul studied the evolutionary game theory in which traders 
are allowed to adapt the actions of each other [10 . 
However it has been found that traditional approaches in economics are 
difficult to generalise to include irrationality [9]. Other models have also been 
proposed. Most noticably is the El Farol bar-attendance problem proposed 
by Arthur [11, 12]. The model considers a group of N people who have to 
decide whether to attend a bar or not on every weekend. According to their 
decisions and the number of seats in the bar there are two possible results: 
crowded or not crowded. A person will be happy if and only if (i) he decides 
to go to the bar and finds that it is not crowded, or (ii) he does not go to 
the bar and it is crowded. So in order to make themselves happy they will 
try to predict the attendance of the bar on every weekend before they decide. 
Each person has his own rules to predict which are based on the past history 
(of a finite past) of the attendance. Each person chooses to believe one of 
his rules according to the rules' past performance. Johnson et al studied the 
model and found that the standard deviation (SD) of the attendance, which 
indicates the "risk", is decreased by increasing the adaptability of the agents 
13]. The model is attractive to physicists since it allows the people to have 
bounded rationality and to adapt to the environment from their experience. 
To physicists, it provides some ideas on developing models of markets involving 
a large number of agents. 
Inspired by the El Farol bar-attendance model, Challet and Zhang pro-
posed the minority game (MG) in 1997 [9]. The model consists of N (odd 
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number) agents and two sides, namely “0” and "1". In each turn the agents 
choose to be in one of the two sides and all agents belong to the minority side 
win. Like the El Parol bar-attendance model, the agents' decisions are based 
on some rules called strategies. Each agent can have s strategies and again he 
decides to use a strategy according to the strategy's performace. The agents 
only know the winning sides of the turns, but not the actual attendance. All 
agents have access to the same global information. Moreover, they have mem-
ory size m such that they can only make use of the information on the winning 
sides of the most current m turns in making decision. Finally, each agent does 
not care about the decisions of others, i.e., no explicit linkages are assigned 
among the agents. However, numerical results showed that the agents still 
exhibit a kind of organisation and cooperation in some cases [9]. If we regard 
the two sides of the game to be "buying" and "selling" a commodity, then we 
have a toy model of financial markets. 
This simple yet inspiring model soon attracted the attention of many physi-
cists. Many extensions and generalizations of the MG have been proposed, 
often with the aim to make it more realistic. 
The thesis is devoted to investigate several new variations on the MG. In 
Chapter 2, the original model of the MG is stated with some of the important 
concepts and theories reviewed. In Chapter 3，various existing extensions and 
generalizations of the MG are reviewed. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5，two 
independent variations of the MG are introduced. These modifications aim at 
making the agents more realistic. In Chapter 4 the agents are allowed not to 
choose any side and stay neutral in a turn under some condition. In Chapter 5 
the agents can only have information on their strategies' recent performance. 
We focus on the new phenomena in the modified models. We also study the 
mixed-population version of the models, in which agents with different prop-
erties compete in the same game. The interaction between different kinds of 
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agents is the main focus. In Chapter 6, the two modifications introduced sep-
arately in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are incorporated simultaneously. Chapter 
7 gives a conclusion on the work studied in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 
A brief review on the basic 
minority game 
The minority game (MG) is a model proposed by Challet and Zhang [9] in 
1997. In the model, a number of agents compete for limited resources through 
a series of decision making. As an agent-based model, it has the following 
characteristics: 
• It is a binary game. In each turn, the anounced outcome only involves 
one of two possible signals; and the agents' decisions also involve only 
two possible actions. 
• The agents are inductive rather than deductive. Their decisions are based 
on their own experience, and they do not know the decisions of the other 
agents except a global outcome representing the collective result of the 
agents' actions. 
• All agent has the same finite memory size. 
This chapter serves as a brief review on the MG. In Section 2.1, we define 
the model of the MG. In Section 2.2, we introduce some important phonomena 
emerged from the model. In Section 2.3, we review some of the concepts 
involved in theories proposed for the MG. 
6 
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2.1 Model 
First of all there are N agents, and there are two rooms, room “0” and room 
“1”. The game is to be played turn by turn, and each turn is also called a time-
step. In each time-step, each agent chooses to attend one of the two rooms. 
All agents decide independently, i.e., they do not know the choices of the other 
agents. Their decisions are based on their own finite set of "strategies" which 
will be defined later. After all agents have chosen a room, the attendances of 
both rooms are counted. The room with the lower attendance is the winning 
room in that time-step. In order to avoid draw games, N is always taken to 
be odd. The agents who have attended the winning room are said to belong 
to the winning group, and are regarded as the winners in that time-step. The 
winning room of each time-step is recorded. This record is called "history" 
which is simply a sequence of 0 and 1. The history is made available to all 
agents as global information. Finally all winners will be rewarded a point. This 
is also called "real point", serving as a limited resources, since by definition 
the total real points given in a time-step will not exceed Then all agents 
leave their chosen room, and a new time-step begins. 
The strategy pool in the MG is defined as follows. First we assume that the 
agents only have finite memory size m. This means that at each time-step they 
can only make their decisions based on the most recent m bits in the history. 
Note that there are 2爪 possible histories. A strategy is then a function which 
maps each of the histories to one of the two rooms. So a strategy predicts 
the next minority room for all possible situations. As a function, its domain 
contains discrete values and the range contains only 2 values. Therefore 
there exist only different strategies for a given rn. The whole set of possible 
strategies form the strategy pool of the game. For example, Fig. 2.1 shows 
2 of the 256 possible strategies for in = 3. For an agent using strategy (a), 
if the winning rooms in the last three time-steps are (0, 1,0), then the agent 
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will go to room 1. Note that an agent using strategy (b) always goes to room 
0，no matter what happens. Although strategy (b) looks quite strange when 
compared with strategy (a), they are equally good. In fact, there does not 
exist a best strategy intrinsically. 
strategy (a) strategy (b) 
h i s t o r y p r e d i c t i o n h i s t o r y p r e d i c t i o n 
000 0 000 0 
001 0 001 0 
010 1 010 0 
on 0 on 0 
100 1 100 0 
101 1 101 0 
110 0 no 0 
111 1 111 0 
Figure 2.1: Two of the 256 possible strategies in the m = 3 strategy pool. 
Before the game starts, each agent randomly picks s strategies from the 
pool, with repetitions allowed. Each agent holds his set of strategies through-
out the whole game. After each time-step, each of the strategies which would 
have predicted the outcome correctly is awarded a virtual point, no matter it 
is actually adopted by an agent or not. The virtual point thus serves as an 
indication on the performance of a strategy. In the ^-th time-step, the success 
rate r{t) of a strategy can be evaluated as 
r � = ^ ^ (2.1) 
where vp(t — 1) is the total virtual points obtained by the strategy in the 
previous (t — 1) time-steps. If an agent finds that the s strategies do not give 
a common prediction, he follows the one with the highest success rate. The 
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importance of s is that it gives the agents adaptivity in such a way that when 
a strategy does not work they may use an alternative strategy. 
As a summary, we recall that the basic MG is characterized by three pa-
rameters {N,m, s} , where N is the total number of agents, m is the memory 
size, and s is the number of strategies per agent. 
2.2 Results 
In every time-step, all agents choose one of the two rooms. Therefore we al-
ways have i V o � + 7 V i � 二 N, where No{t) and N八i) are the numbers of agents 
in room 0 and room 1 at the t-th time-step, respectively. Figure 2.2 (a) and 
(b) show the time series of Ni{t) for two games with the same N and s but 
different m. 
1 9 2 ^ . , 
s E i i i i i i i i 
(a ) m = 3 
6 4 ‘ ‘ — 
0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 
1 9 2 , , 
1 6 0 - -
f 128 
9 6 - -
(b) m = 6 
6 4 ‘ ‘ — 
0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 
t 
Figure 2.2: Typical time series of Ni{t) for m = 3 and m = 6. Other parameters 
are N = 257 and s = 2. 
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Since the two rooms are symmetric, Ni{t) should fluctuate around y . This 
feature is shown in both Fig. 2.2 (a) and (b). However the fluctuation of Ni{t) 
is smaller when m = 6. A smaller fluctuation of Ni{t) reflects two things: (i) 
the agents take a lower risk, and (ii) there is a smaller waste of the resource. 
From the figures, it seems that agents with better analysing power (larger m) 
can create a time series of lower fluctuation. To check this, we use the stan-
dard deviation (SD) of the attendance in room 1 to measure the fluctuation, 
i.e. (Ji = \/< N'^  > — < N � 2 . From Fig. 2.3, we observe that ai does not 
decrease with m monotonically. Instead there is a minimun at m = 7 after 
which 0*1 increases gradually to a so-called coin-toss limit. The name is given 
because at such limit the agents act as if they are making their decisions ran-
domly, and therefore ai is simply given by 字 . 




3 0 I 
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Figure 2.3: The m-dependence of ai for the MG. Other parameters are N = 257 
and s = 2. For each m there are 1000 circles which indicate the results of 1000 
independent runs. The dotted line joins the averages over the runs for each value of 
m. 
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Let rUc be the value of m at which ai shows a minimum (e.g. in Fig. 2.3， 
we have mc = 7). The m-dependence of ai for other values of N and s is also 
studied. It is found that the minimum in ai exists as long as the value of s 
is not too large. Changing the values of N and s alters the values of rric and 
the corresponding minimum gi . The significance of the decreasing Gi is that 
although the agents in MG are selfish by definition, they can still show a kind 
of cooperation. The minimum of gi at rric indicates that such cooperation is 
most effective when m = rric. 
Many physicists have tried to explain the features of MG. In the next 
section we will review some of the main concepts in the literature. 
2.3 Discussion 
2.3.1 Bit-string Statistics and Market Efficiency 
Savit et al [14] identified that as m changes across mc, the system undergoes a 
phase transition in an information point of view. To understand the difference 
between the two phases, they studied the bit-string statistics of the history of 
MG. First of all they let Uk be a binary bit-string of order k. For any k, there 
are possible Uk. For example when k 二 2, U2 can be one of the four possible 
strings, namely {00, 01，10, 11}. Given the whole history of a game, they define 
as the conditional probability of finding a “1” immediately following 
the string Uk in the history. Note that by definition + = 1 
for any string Uk. For a given m-bit game, they considered the cases k = m 
and k — m-\-l and check whether the values of P{l\uk) are uniform. They 
found that the bit-string statistics can be classified into two types according 
to the values of m. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show typical results for the two types 
of behaviour. 
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Case 1: small m 
k = m = 4 众= m + 1= 5 
1.0 ——；~~. 1 1 . 1.0 ——z-——. 1 , 
0.8 0.8 -
0.6 0.6 - nn n W 
^ _ n 
t nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn _ ![ t J I h . r n 
^ 0.4 0.4 - 1 -
。.2. : 。 . 2 . I L 
0.0 1丨丨丨 III" I丨'丨丨 11_丨 0.0 ^^丨川11|"111,丨丨丨丨"丨謹1.""1川".11 
-5 0 5 10 15 20 -5 5 15 25 35 
Figure 2.4: The bit-string statistics for MG with m = 4. Other parameters are 
N = 257 and s = 2. 
When m is small, e.g. m 二 4, the bit-string statistics is shown in Fig. 
2.4. All histograms for A; < m are flat. Only the k = m case is shown here. 
This implies that the history string contains no predictive information, as the 
agents are also playing with memory size m. Since the m-bit information has 
been extracted thoroughly by the m-bit agents, therefore they referred to this 
phase as "efficient" [14]. The histogram for /c 二 m + 1 is not flat. This is to 
show that the the history string is not simply a random sequence of “0” and 
"1". For a random sequence, the distribution P{l\uk) should be flat for all 
values of k. Therefore the history string does contain some information, only 
that this information cannot be exploited by the agents. 
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Case 2: large m 
k = m = 7 A: = m + 1= 8 
1.0 • 1 r—"", , . 1.0 1 . . 1 1 1 
0.8 • 0.8 -
麵 ilii -
。.2 - ; I 。.2 I M “ 
0.0——I jliLmbm^—ime——0.0 ——I政 M ‘ imim—— 
-25 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 
Figure 2.5: The bit-string statistics for MG with m = 7. Other parameters are 
N = 257 and s = 2. 
On the other hand, when m is large, e.g. m = 7, the bit-string statistics 
is found to be qualitatively different. In Fig. 2.5, it is observed that the 
histogram ioi k — m is not flat. (Although they are not shown here, the 
histograms for /c < m are also not flat.) This means that the history string 
contains predictive information which can be exploited by the agents. Since 
significant m-bit information is still available to the m-bit agents, this phase 
is referred to as "inefficient" [14]. Although information is left in history bit-
strings of any length, however the agents have insufficient strategies to allow 
them to profit from the information as the size of the pool of strategies grows 
rapidly with m. 
Savit et al [14] studied the bit-string statistics for different m, they found 
that the market change from efficient to inefficient phase as m increases through 
rric. For m < rric the market is efficient and no strategies perform better than 
others in long term. For m > rric the market is inefficient and some strategies 
may perform better in long term. Moreover, they found that for small s, rric 
exists and satisfies the relation � 1 [14.. 
N.s J 
Chapter 2 A brief review on the basic minority game 14 
2.3.2 Crowds and Anticrowds Effect 
Johnson et al [15] provide a different picture to explain the features of cri, which 
involves the grouping of agents. Given any strategy there exists another 
strategy P such that the pair always make opposite predictions. They call /3 
and P an anti-correlated strategy pair. Let np and n百 be the number of agents 
using and p respectively. Then the np agents will always go to the same 
room and the n爲 agents will always go to another room. They call n � and n百 
a pair of crowd and anticrowd. Johnson et al found that the relative size of 
crowd and anticrowd plays an important role in determining the fluctuation 
cTi. Consider any one of the anti-correlated strategy pairs. If the size of the 
crowd is close to that of the anticrowd, then the fluctuation contributed by 
them would be small. Otherwise, the fluctuation contributed by them would 
be large. They proposed an empirical formula to calculate <Ji, 
= ‘ (2.2) 
where the summation runs over every anti-correlated strategy pairs. The re-
sults of the formula agree quite well with that of simulations [15, 16 . 
We are ready to discuss the features of ai qualitatively. At every time-
step, we can rank all the strategies in the strategy space according to their 
performance. By definition, the strategies in the higher ranks should be anti-
correlated with that in the lower ranks. When m is small, the strategy space 
is small compared with N ‘ s, thus the strategy in the higher rank are held 
by many agents. Therefore most agents use the high-rank strategies and few 
agents use the anti-correlated low-rank strategy. This makes the sizes of crowds 
much greater than that of the anticrowds, and practically the fluctuation is 
contributed by a few large crowds and a large ai results. When m is large, 
the strategy space is very large, only a small number of strategies are selected 
by the agents. Therefore the fluctuation is contributed by N crowds of size 
1. Since the decisions of these crowds are highly uncorrelated, the agents are 
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essentially playing independently. Therefore we have o � k 孕 . O n e can also 
check the validity of Eq.(2.2) in the coin-toss limit. Note that in this case the 
summation in Eq.(2.2) contains N terms and for all terms we put n^ = 1 and 
rip = 0, so that we have ai ^ 字 . 
For intermediate m, if s is small some agents pick the high-ranking strate-
gies only and some agents pick the low-ranking strategies only. Therefore we 
have crowds and anticrowds of similar sizes, and the cancellation effect in fluc-
tuation is effective leading to a small ai. However, if s is large, then many 
agents are able to pick both high-ranking and low-ranking strategies. The 
cancellation becomes less effective. Therefore as s increases, the minimum of 
(7i vanishes. 
2.3.3 Hamming Distance and Reduced Strategies Space 
D'hulst el al [17] and Challet el al [18] introduced the use of the concepts 
of Hamming distance and reduced strategies space in MG respectively. Ham-
ming distance quantifies the correlation between two strategies. The Hamming 
distance d between two strategies jS and /3' is defined by 
2爪 
去:ElA — ( 2 . 3 ) 
Z = 1 
where jSi and are the z-th prediction of the corresponding strategies. If j3 
and P' are the same strategy (i.e. correlated), d = 0. If fi and always give 
opposite predictions (i.e. anti-correlated), d = 1. If P and (3' give the same or 
opposite predictions with the same chance (i.e. uncorrelated), d = Thus d 
measures the difference between two strategies and j3'• 
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In the pool of strategies for given m, there exists a subset of 2 • 2爪 
strategies that satisfy the following three conditions: 
• The subset of 2 • 2爪 strategies form 2爪 pairs of anti-correlated strategies. 
Each pair is separated hy d = 1. 
• Strategies from different pairs in the subset are uncorrelated to each 
other {d = 
• Each of the strategies outside the subset can be found to have d < ^ to 
one of the strategies inside the subset. 
If we accept the approximation that strategies within a Hamming distance 
of < I can be represented by one strategy, then the above subset of 2 . 
2讯 strategies can be taken to represent the full set of strategies. This 
subset is called the reduced strategy space [18]. The reduced strategy space 
is much smaller than the full strategy space, yet numerical simulations show 
that replacing the latter by the former does not alter the dynamics of the MG. 
This feature simplifies numerical studies on MG significantly. 
Chapter 3 
A brief review on existing 
variations on the minority game 
Based on the MG, many physicists began to study its features and properties. 
They also proposed different extensions and generalizations of the game. This 
chapter serves as a short review on some of these variations. 
3.1 Darwinism process and MG 
Challet et al introduced evolution into MG in such a way that after every fixed 
period of time the poorest agent is allowed to replace his strategies with those 
held by the best agents [18]. They called this Darwinism process and they 
found that this process reduces the risk, which is represented by the SD of the 
game [18 . 
3.2 Evolutionary MG (EMG) 
Johnson et al proposed an evolutionary minority game (EMG) [19]. In EMG, 
agents hold one and the same strategy. The strategy is dynamical as it is 
modified turn by turn according to the recent history of the game. Each agent 
is independently assigned a "gene value" p. With probability p the agent 
17 
Chapter 3 A brief review on existing variations on the minority game 18 
follows the strategy's prediction and with probability (1 - p) he will take the 
opposite action. Every agent can be evolved by changing their p-value if he 
finds himself performing poorer than some given tolerence level. It is found 
that after sufficiently long time, the final probability distribution among 
the agents becomes peaked near p = 0 and 1, regardless of the initial P(p) 
distribution [19]. Besides, the final F(p) distribution is independent of the 
value of m. 
3.3 Modified EMG (MEMG) 
D'hulst et al proposed a modified evolutionary minority game (MEMG) [17 . 
In MEMG, each agent still has his p-value and can also change it under the 
same rule as in EMG. The difference from EMG is that in MEMG each agent 
has his own static strategy which is assigned in the beginning of the game. The 
final P{p) distribution [17] exhibits peaks near p = 0 and 1, similar to that 
of the basic EMG. However, Johnson et al pointed out that the two models 
are not equivalent [20]. A crucial difference between the models is that for 
the basic EMG the final distribution and the SD of the attendance are 
m-independent, while for the MEMG they become m-dependent [20, 21. 
3.4 MG with arbitrary cutoff 
Johnson et al generalised the MG to arbitrary cutoffs [22]. For a game with 
cutoff L, the capacities of the two rooms would become L and (A厂—L) re-
spectively, where N is the total number of agents as defined before. Therefore 
one of the rooms can accept more than half of the agents. The maximum 
possible number of winners is no longer ^ ^ and the symmetry between the 
two rooms is broken. An exception is the special case of L = In such 
case the symmetry between the two rooms is restored and the model reduces 
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to the basic MG. Simulations showed that for L differs from the mean 
attendances of the rooms in different runs tend to divide into two groups [22 . 
The SD corresponding to these two groups are quite different [22 . 
3.5 Thermal MG (TMG) 
Cavagna et al proposed the thermal MG (TMG) [23] in which agents are not 
forced to use their best strategies all the time. Instead agents can use other 
strategies with a certain probability. Their results show that such relaxation 
reduces the SD of the attendance in some cases [23]. The results can be 
explained in terms of the crowd-anticrowd theory [24, 25 . 
3.6 Three-Sided MG 
D'hulst et al proposed a three-sided MG, in which the third side can be inter-
preted either as active traders trading with the other two sides in a cyclic sense, 
or as inactive traders. The former is called symmetric model while the latter 
is called asymmetric model [26]. Numerical results showed that the symmetric 
model is a direct extension of the basic MG [26]. For the asymmetric model, 
it is observed that the number of inactive traders is monotonically increasing 
with m. In the large m limit, the number of inactive traders approach one 
third of the total agents. Recently, Chan et al [27] generalized the idea to 
multiple-choice MG. 
3.7 MG with variable payoffs 
Challet et al [9] and Li et al [28] considered the MG with variable payoffs. 
In MG, agents with more than one available strategies will use the one with 
the best cumulative performance. The performance of a strategy is quantified 
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by a number called the virtual point. In the basic MG, the strategies which 
would have predicted the minority room correctly are rewarded one unit of 
virtual point, regardless of the attendence of the minority room. However, one 
can imagine that in some cases we may want to distinguish a "good" minority 
from a "bad" one [9]. For example an agent feel goods if the attendence is 50 
in the minority group for a population of TV 二 101 and he is one of the 50 
winners. But he may feel even better if the attendence is 1 as he is the only 
winner. Li et al [28] introduced the payoffs function A, which is the amount 
of points given to each winning agent and winning strategy. The basic MG 
thus corresponds to a constant payoff function A = 1. Li et al [28] considered 
payoff functions of the form A { r ) � a n d A(r)�e—where r is the ratio 
of the number of agents in the minority group to the whole population. They 
found that such changes do not alter the cooperative behaviour of the game. 
The observed feature can also be explained within the crowd-anticrowd theory 
29, 30 . 
Chapter 4 
Minority game with varying 
number of participants 
Recall that under the rules of the basic MG, an agent always uses his most 
successful strategy and follows its prediction in every time-step. However, 
there may be situations in which even the most successful strategy is not that 
successful at all. For example, consider an agent holding three strategies which 
have lost 100%, 99% and 98% in the previous time-steps respectively. The 
agent will then use his "most successful" strategy, i.e. the third strategy, and 
attend the room it predicts. We believe that a more realistic and reasonable 
agent would rather quit, at least temporarily, in such situation. In order to 
give the agents more freedom, we propose a modified version of the MG. In 
this modified version the agents are allowed to leave the game temporarily, i.e., 
refuse to enter the game, under a specified condition. 
In Section 4.1, we define the modified MG, present some typical numerical 
results, and try to explain the features. In Section 4.2，we investigate the 
mixed-population version of this model, in which agents playing the basic and 
modified MG form a mixed-population and to compete in the same game. 
21 
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4.1 The modified MG 
4.1.1 Model 
The strategy pool and the parameters {TV, m, 5} of the modified MG are defined 
in the same way as in the basic MG. Readers are referred to Chapter 2 for 
details. The only difference in the modified MG is that a condition is imposed, 
under which an agent will decide to stay out of the game temporarily. This 
condition involves a new parameter Tmin- As in the basic MG, each agent 
searches his own set of s strategies for the one with the highest success rate 
r{t) in each turn. Readers are referred to Eq.(2.1) for the definition of success 
rate. However, unlike the basic MG, an agent will follow the prediction of this 
strategy if and only if the strategy has r(t) higher than or equal to a minimum 
requirement Tmin- Otherwise, he decides not to enter any one of the rooms and 
stays out of the game for that turn. Since the success rates of his strategies 
will still be updated in each turn, he may be able to re-join the game later. 
In the modified MG the existence of minority side is not guaranteed, as 
there may be agents leaving the game temporarily. If there are equal number 
of agents in both sides, we randomly pick one room to be the winning side and 
award the real/virtual points as usual. Another unusual case is that we may 
have one or even both rooms empty in some turns. If only one of the rooms 
is empty, we still regard the empty room to be the minority room. Although 
actually there are no winners and so no real points are given, we will still give 
virtual points to the strategies which predict the empty room. If both rooms 
are empty, we again randomly pick one room to be the winning side, and 
give virtual points as usual. It should be pointed out that these two unusual 
situations do not occur \-ery often, except for some high enough r 顺 which 
will be discussed later. 
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The modified MG is, therefore, characterized by four parameters {N, m, s, rmin}-
From now on we denote the present modification of MG by M G { r 爪 N o t e 
that Tmin G [0，1] serves as a criterion of the strategies' success rate. A higher 
Tmin means that the agents are more conservative. For Tmin = 0, the MG{rmin} 
reduces to the basic MG. 
4.1.2 Results 
Note that all the notations introduced in the basic MG, such as Ni{t) and ai, 
carry the same meaning here. 
(a) T h e rvi in-dependence of MG{r肌 in } 
In the basic MG, we always have all the agents participating the game in every 
turn, i.e., No{t) + Ni{t) = N for all t. However, it may not be the case in the 
Let Natt{t) 二 No{t) + Ni{t) be the total participants of the game 
at time t. The first quantity we are interested in is the r^m-dependence of the 
time averaged number of participants < Natt >• Obviously when Tmin = 0, 
we should have < Natt >二 TV as in the basic MG; and when rmin = 1, we 
should have < Natt > = 0 . For 0 < Tmin < 1, we found the results by numerical 
simulations. 
Figure 4.1 shows the r肌�几-dependence of < Natt > for different values of m. 
In all cases it is observed that when rmin increases from 0, < Natt > is not af-
fected until rmin 二 0.5, at which a sharp transition occurs and < Natt > drops 
to 0 abruptly. For rmin > 0.5, we always have Natt{t) = 0. For rmin < 0.5, 
although Nattif) = TV as in the basic MG, it may happen that rmin alters the 
SD of the room attendence cji. Figure 4.2 shows ai as a function of Vmin for 
different values of m. The results show that ai is changed around rmin — 0.5 
but not for rmin <0.5. 
Chapter 4 Minority game with varying number of participants 24 
257 ‘ MIWWWMWWWWWIWMIWMXWMIWMWWW^-l �m = 3 
A A m = 8 




0 ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ^rmmmmmTPmmmmmm丨,丨丨丨丨丨mmi^刚wimi 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 
厂min 
Figure 4.1: The rmm-dependence of < Natt > for m = 3,8,13. Other parameters 
are N 二 257 and 5 = 2. 
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Figure 4.2: The r^j^-dependence of ai for m = 3, 8,13. Other parameters are 
N = 257 and s = 2. 
The r爪in-dependence of < Natt > and ai is also studied for different values 
of TV, m and s. Features similar to those shown in Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 are 
observed. So we conclude that: (i) for 0 < Tmin < 0 . 5 , behaves 
as the basic MG; (ii) for 0.5 < Tmin < 1, MG{r肌仏} behaves like Tmin = 1, 
which has trivial results; and (iii) for Tmin = 0.5, MG {rmin} reveals some new 
behaviour. From now on we will focus on the case Tmin = 0.5. 
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(b) T h e behav iou r o f 0.5} 
Figure 4.3 shows the time-series of Nattif) for different m at rmin = 0.5. It is 
observed that when m = 1, Natt{t) alters among a few values. As m increases, 
Natt{t) changes with values in two regions. When m satisfies the condition 
^ ^ � 1 , the two regions overlap and combine into one. As m increases fur-
ther, a long transient occurs before a steady state is reached for which Natt {t) 
becomes very small. 
-Arv m = 1 100 
200 丽两麗聰啊閥n咖-,[[卿0；1：)；；^「厕 
m = 2 
100 
onn ！ “ r: v ； .rasBSssHj^ wagCTgmcnioroi^ ariggBrssgagiJj^ jagsejg ��« m = 3 
100 
257 - .''.111'.'. -
m = 4 
100 
257 • 
s 200 ^^ mm^^ ^^ ^ms^ is^ ^^ Mm&m , 
1 m = 5 
；^ 1 0 0 
257 • -
200 mmmmrnmrn^m^^mmm^^^^km^^^mi^ —« 




257 • • ‘ . ‘ -
200 i 
1 0 0 肌 = 9 
257 
200 L 
1 0 0 V 肌 = 1 0 
0 — 
0 10000 20000 
t 
Figure 4.3: The time-series of Natt{t) for different m at rmin = 0.5. Other param-
eters are N = 257 and s = 2. 
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The corresponding distribution bar chat of Natt{t), P{Natt), is shown in 
Fig. 4.4. P{Natt) is normalized such that in each bar chat the sum of heights 
of all the bars is one. The phenomenon of the combination of the two peaks 
is exhibited in this figure. 
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Figure 4.4: The probability (list ribiit ions /)。Y,",). Ot Iht parameters arc N = 257 
and = 2. 
We then investigate if th(、ahovr "卜(k、p(>n(lrnt (cat iirc's rf i i iain for different 
values of N and 6\ To iiiakr thr comparison easier, we evaluate < Natt > again, 
as in Fig. 4.1, but now focus on = 0.5. I-or lar,<々 ‘-川 cases, the transients 
are excluded when evaluating < >. 
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Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the m-dependence of < Natt > at Tmin = 0.5. 
Figure 4.5 shows the results for different N with fixed s; while Fig. 4.6 shows 
the results for different s with fixed N. The drop of < Natt > as m increases 
for all parameters suggest that there is a transition at � 1 . 
1 ^ . ^ ^ . — — . ^ ^ . . . . ~ . . — — . — — . 
0 . 9 
0.8 吻 吻 ‘ ^ 
0.7. • --��.:rk-�\ 
\ 、、、. 、\ 
^ 0 . 6 ； 、 \ 、''、\、 
\ 0 . 5 
V 0 . 4 ； \ \ \ \ 
N O ； ! • •• 1 2 9 \ \ \ V 
0 - 3 ： O-……O � = 2 5 7 � � . \ \ 
0.2 r •--……• TV = 513 
0 1 L A--……么 /V = 1 0 2 5 
0 ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ — — • … 丨 … … \ ‘ “ … … • 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 11 1 2 1 3 
m 
Figure 4.5: The m-dependence of < Natt > at rmin = 0.5. The results for four 
different values of N are shown. In all cases s 二 2, 
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Figure 4.6: The m-dependence of < Natt > at rmm = 0.5. The results for three 
different values of s are shown. In all cases N = 257. 
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The transition at rmin = 0.5 can be understood by considering the success 
rates of a pair of mutually anti-correlated strategies. Such pair has a total 
success rate of unity, as the outcome must be either 1 or 0 in each turn. If one 
strategy in a pair has a success rate higher than 0.5, then the partner has a 
success rate less than 0.5. 
In the small m regime, it is likely that all the strategies in the pool are 
picked initially. Many agents can then hold at least one of the higher-ranking 
strategies with a success rate higher than 0.5. It follows that there exists a large 
crowd of agents joining the game. Most probably, the agents lose if the higher-
ranking strategies all point to the same prediction. The success rate of the 
strategy actually in play will then decrease, with a corresponding increase in 
the anti-correlated strategy's success rate. The roles of the two strategies in a 
pair may interchange as the game proceeds. However, the presence of strategies 
with success rates higher than 0.5 ensures that an appreciable fraction of the 
whole population enters the games. 
In the large m regime, the size of the pool of strategies is large. The 
strategies picked initially represent only a small portion of the whole pool of 
strategies. It is likely that only one strategy of a mutually anti-correlated 
pair is actually picked by the agents and in play. Strategies in play are more 
likely to lose than unused strategies. It is because the winning criteria ensures 
that there are more losers than winners. An agent goes into side “0”，say, 
reduces the chance of side “0” being the winning side. Therefore, nearly all 
the strategies in play are being lower-ranked in terms of the success rate and 
have success rates lower than 0.5 in the large m regime. As a result, the number 
of participants drops drastically as m increases and eventually all agents are 
blocked from joining the game. 
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(c) C o m p a r i s o n be tween 二 0.5} and the basic M G 
One of the main features in the basic MG is that the plot of ai against m 
exhibits a minimum around ^ 1. We would like to check if this is still 
JM-s 
the case for 二 0.5}. Figure 4.7 compares cfi of the two games that 
differ only by the value of Vmin- For small m, imposing Tmin increases ai. For 
large m, gi becomes very small. As a result the minimum around ^ ^ � 1 
disappears in MG {rmin = 0 .5 } . 
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Figure 4.7: The m-dependence of ai for rmin = 0 and rmin = 0.5. Other parameters 
are N = 257 and s = 2. Note that the rmin = 0 case is the basic MG, as given in 
Fig. 2.3. 
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Note that Fig. 4.7 may be somewhat misleading. In the basic MG we 
have the concept that a small ai refers to a small waste of resource. With 
Fig. 4.7, one is tempted to conclude that in the modified MG, agents with 
large m perform quite well. However together with Fig. 4.8 one would realize 
that the ai is small because < 7 V i � i s extremely small. One can also deduces 
the same result from Figs. 4.5 and 4.6, because by symmetry we should have 
< iVi i < Natt > 
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Figure 4.8: The m-dependence of < A^ i > for Tmin = 0 and r^m = 0.5. Other 
parameters are N = 257 and s = 2. 
The main point is that in MG{r—几=0.5} we no longer have < N! |iV. 
So it is not reliable to consider ai alone for the agents' performance. To better 
reflect the agents' performance, we calculate directly the amount of real points 
obtained by the agents in both models. (Recall that in both models each 
winning agent gets a real point in each turn.) Note that in the modified MG 
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the number of participants Natt may not equal N. Therefore it is better to 
calculate "the time average of the real points obtained per participant per 
turn", or < rp/part./turn >, which is defined as 
, , , n u m b e r of winners � , � 
< rp /par t . / tu rn >=〈——-——-—————-)• (4.1) 
number or participants 
From now on we will take < rp/part./turn > as the standard reference when 
the performance of a group of agents is considered. 
As an application, we keep all the parameters of Fig. 4.7 unchanged, and 
calculate < rp/part./turn >. Figure 4.9 shows the results. For all m, agents 
with rmin = 0.5 cannot improve their performance, as compared with for basic 
MG. 
0.5 [ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ^ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 1 
• 參 鲁 蜃 # • 0 
.......•..::..，』..…..1 
0 - 4 ••,， . . : . o " .•力 . . 
： . 0 - " \ 




、 0 . 2 ； 
V 
• • r . = 0 
n -1 mm 
O.I ： Q”……G 厂：二 0.5 ……^•() 
Q L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I ！ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
m 
Figure 4.9: The m-dependence of < rp/part./turn > for rmin = 0 and r^m = 0.5. 
Other parameters are N = 257 and s = 2. 
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The agents in MG {rmin = 0.5} seem to be acting more cautiously than 
those in the basic MG. However as shown in Fig. 4.9, agents in MG{r爪細=0.5} 
do not perform as well as those in the basic MG. The reason may be that we 
have let all the agents become equally cautious. In addition, for the agents 
not playing the game temporarily, we also let them adapt to the outcomes in 
the turns that they are absent. All the strategies in play are therefore being 
exposed to the same environment. In doing so, it is hard to reduce the crowd 
effects, which are the major factors for the suppressed < rp/part./turn > in 
the small m regime for the basic MG. 
(d) Col lapse of da ta for = 0.5} 
In the basic MG, the data of the SD of room attendance for different values of 
the parameters fall nearly on the same curve in a rescaled plot of against 
provided that the value of s is not too large [31]. Figure 4.10 shows that 
in MG{rmin = 0.5}, if we plot …against the data also fall nearly 
on the same curve for different choices of the parameters. 
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Figure 4.10: Data plotted using rescaled axes. A rough collapse of the data from 
the modified MG is observed. 
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4.2 Mixed-population 
4.2.1 Model 
We study a model in which agents with Tmin 二 0.5 and agents with Tmin — 0 
play together and compete. The model is defined as follows. Consider a system 
of TV agents. Some of the agents use rmin — 0.5 and the rest use rmin = 0. Each 
of the N agents picks s strategies from the same strategy pool of memory size 
m. As the game proceeds, all agents make their decisions according to their 
strategies and rmin- Note that each agent does not know the Vmin of others. 
The number of agents in each of the sides is recorded, and a history string is 
then created and annouced to the whole population as before. Since the game 
consists of two different kinds of agents, we refer to it as the "alloy" game. 
4.2.2 Results 
As an example, we take N = 256 and s = 2, and study the alloy game for 
different values of m. For each m, we consider different numbers of rmin = 0.5 
agents, and study how the alloy's properties are affected by its composition. 
We will focus on the case of m = 1 first. 
Figures 4.11 (a) and (b) show the results of the number of participants 
and < rp/part./turn >, respectively. In both figures, the x-axis is the number 
of rmin = 0.5 agents among the total 256 agents. From left to right, the 
composition of the alloy changes from a "pure 二 0} (i.e. basic 
MG)" to a "pure MG{rmin = 0.5}". There are three sets of data in each 
figure. The solid line denotes the overall results contributed by the whole 
mixed population, the black circles denote the results only when the Tmin = 0 
agents are considered and the open circles denote the results only when the 
Tmin = 0.5 agents are considered. 
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all agents 
• 厂 - = 0 agents 
° 二 0.5 agents 
(a) (b) 
pure basic MG pure MG{r„„ = 0.5} pure basic MG pure M G ( r ^ = 0.5) 
256 • 1 0.5 I—— ” 
I 192 . 0.4 • 
^ 128 . ？ 
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number of = 0.5 agents number of 厂阳们 二 0.5 agents 
Figure 4.11: The results of the alloyed MG for m : : 1. Others parameters are 
N = 256 and s = 2. 
Figure 4.11 (a) shows that the basic agents with = 0 always participate 
as they supposed to be. For the agents with /.川川 ~ 0.5, note that although 
the number of Vmin = 0.5 participants is not (�qu"l to the number of Tmin — 0.5 
‘ ,, , . n u m b e r of /•,,,„ == 0.5 i)ar( ici pants . , , mi • agents，the ratio 讓】山 ( � r J = ( ) 丨 “ 丨 ！ constant. This means 
that the fraction or the teiidcncy for the. /’,",,,=().厂）agents to join the game 
does not change with th(�composition of the alloy. In other words, no matter 
what the composition is, tlir / = 0.5 a<i,(Miis jiisi behave as if they are in 
a pure MG{r„ „ „ = 0.5} with the saiiio value of /". In Fig. 4.11 (b), the 
horizontal lines show that a l though the two kinds of a gouts are mixed arid 
they play together uii(l(�r thr saiii(�history hii si rinn-. tlirv do not affect the 
performance of each other. T h � a h o v r {"catiires ‘)1)S<TV('(1 in M = 1 remain for 
other 171 as long as m is small .such that � 1 . l-'i-j^ iirc 4.12 shows the res nits 
for in — 1，3, 5. 
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• m^in = 0 agents 
° m^in = 0.5 agents 
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Figure 4.12: The results of alloyed MG for small values of m. Others parameters 
are N = 256 and s — 2. 
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When m becomes large, some new features emerge. In Fig. 4.13，we ob-
serve that if the number of Tmin = 0.5 agents is small enough, these cautious 
agents do benefit from the presence of rmin = 0 agents. This is reflected by (i) 
more rmin = 0.5 agents is willing to join the game when compared with the 
pure rmin = 0.5 game; and (ii) the performance of the rmin = 0.5 agents is im-
proved in that their < rp/part./turn > becomes better, even better than that 
of the rmin = 0 agents, when the number of Tmin = 0.5 agents is sufficiently 
small. 
all a g e n t s 
• '"min = 0 a g e n t s 
° '-min = 0 .5 a g e n t s 
2 5 6 t 0 .5 — I 
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n u m b e r of r^,^ = 0.5 agen ts n u m b e r of r^.^ = 0 .5 a g e n t s 
Figure 4.13: The results of alloyed MG for large rn. Others parameters are N = 256 
and 5 = 2. 
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4.2.3 Discussions 
The above features of mixed-population MG can be understood by observing 
the bit-string statistics of the separated games. In particular we will consider 
the statistics of the bit-string with length k = m of the pure games. 
basic MG = 0-5} 
m = k = 3 m = k = 3 
1 I I I I I I I I 1 I I 1 1 i 1 i 1 
- - - . 
0 . 8 - 0 . 8 - -
_ 0.6 - 0.6 - -
1— I I I I I -
^ 0.4 - -14 - -
0.2 - -3.2 - -
Q I_I 1 11 I M I 11 I 11 I 11 I M I M I I__I Q I_I I M I M I 11 I M I M I M t 11 I I 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Figure 4.14: The bit-string statistics for the pure basic MG and pure MG{r爪；几= 
0.5} for /c = m = 3. Others parameters are N = 257 and 5 = 2. 
Figure 4.14 shows the results for the small m regime, together with the re-
sults corresponding to the basic MG for comparison. The bit-string statistics 
of the two pure games with m = 3 are shown. The histograms for both games 
are flat. Therefore in the mixed-population game, both groups contribute zero 
m-bit information to the global history. As a result each group of agents can-
not "feel" the existence of the other group, and the two groups effectively have 
no interactions, as indicated by the results shown in Fig. 4.12. 
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basic MG MG{r_ = 0.5} 
m = k=8 m = k=8 
1 P rn I 1 i I 1 i 1 1 
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^k 认k 
Figure 4.15: The bit-string statistics for the pure basic MG and pure MG{r^ j^n = 
0.5} ktr k 二 m = 8. Others parameters are N 二 257 and 5 = 2. 
Figure 4.15 shows the bit-string statistics of the two pure games with m = 
8，corresponding to the large m regime. The histograms for both games are 
not flat. This means that if any one of the groups dominates in the mixed-
population, the history bit-string that is essentially decided by this group can 
provide some m-bit information so that the other group of agents can take 
advantage of. In addition, we observe that the histogram for the pure basic 
MG has a larger fluctuation. This implies that the history string of a pure basic 
MG contains more information, compared with that of a pure = 0.5}. 
Therefore the history bit-string generated mostly by Tmin = 0 agents in a 
mixed-population consisting mostly of r— 二 0 agents allows agents of the 
other group {rmin = 0.5 agents) to take advantage of. This explains the higher 
< rp/part./turn > of the r爪饥 二 0.5 agents for. say, m = 8 as shown in Fig. 
4.13 for small concentrations of '“舰 二 0.5 agents. 
Chapter 5 
Minority game considering 
recent performance of strategies 
In this Chapter, we consider another modification to the MG. In the basic 
MG, each agent holds s strategies and uses the one with the best accumulative 
performance at each time-step. This is a long term performance, since the 
virtual points of all strategies are accumulated from the beginning of the game. 
Knowing that the agents only have finite memory size for the history, we 
suggest that it would be reasonable for them to also have finite memory size 
for the performance of their strategies. In this Chapter, we modify the MG so 
that the agents only consider the performance of their strategies over a finite 
number of recent time-steps. 
In Section 5.1, we define the modified MG, present some typical numerical 
results, and try to explain the features. In Section 5.2, we investigate the 
mixed population version of this model, in which agents playing the basic and 
modified MG are mixed together and enter the same game. 
39 
Chapter 5 Minority game co'iistdcrviig nr.rii'L pcrJoriiKUhcc of strategies 40 
5.1 The modified MG 
5.1.1 Model 
The strategy pool and the parameters {N/m, 5} of the modified MG are de-
fined in the same way as in the basic MG. Readers are referred to Chapter 2 
for details. The only difference in the present modification of MG is in the 
definition of the strategies' success rate. The new definition involves a new 
parameter T. A strategy's success rate in the t-th time-step in this modified 
MG is defined as 
rW 二 擎 ， (5.1) 
so the modified MG is characterized by four parameters {N,m,s,T�. The 
parameter T is the time scale over which a strategy's performance is recorded. 
From now on we denote the present modification by MG{T} . Note that in 
M G { T } all agents use r肌仏=0 as in the basic MG. By comparing Eq.(5.1) 
with Eq.(2.1), we note that it is required to run at least T steps of the basic 
MG first before we can get a sufficiently long performance history to start the 
MG{T} . 
5.1.2 Results 
Note that all the notations introduced in the basic MG, such as Ni{t) and ai, 
carry the same meaning here. 
(a) The t i m e series of N i ( t ) i n M G { T } 
As we confine ourselves to the case rmm = 0, we have < Natt >= N. By 
symmetry we also know that < N^ >二< 1%〉二 . To investigate how 
Ni{t) is affected after introducing T, we plot the time series of i V i � . T y p i c a l 
results for m = 3 and T = 127 are shown in Fig. 5.1. As mentioned at the 
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end of section 5.1.1, a short basic MG with length equals to 127 time-steps is 
executed first. Then comes the first time-step of MG{T 二 127}, in which the 
r ( l ) of each strategy can be calculated from its virtual points obtained in the 
127 time-steps of the basic MG. So the agents can decide which strategy to use 
and choose a side, then an outcome is announced, and the second time-step 
begins. Starting from this moment, the agents always record the virtual points 
obtained in the recent T = 127 time-steps only and the game M G { T = 127} 
proceeds. 
256 1 1 1 1 1 I 
1 9 2 - I 丨 丨 丨 ' 丨 ) 丨 丨 丨 , / 1 I 
5 
64 ： 1 11 1 I I I i If || |j . 
0 1 1 1 1 I I 
-127-100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 
t 
Figure 5.1: The time series of Ni{t) in MG{T = 127} for m = 3. Other parameters 
are N = 257 and s = 2. 
For comparison, we also show the Ni{t) of the 127 time-steps of the basic 
MG in Fig. 5.1. Once the game MG{T 二 127} begins, it is observed that the 
time series of Ni{t) changes into another steady state with the same mean but 
larger fluctuations. In what follows, the basic MG portion of the time series 
will be excluded in all further discussions on MG{T} . 
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(b ) T h e T -dependence o f M G { T } 
To investigate the changes on the fluctuation for a general T, we consider 
the T-dependence of cr： with different values of m. Figure 5.2 shows the T-
dependence of ai for m = 1. It is observed that ai changes periodically with 
a period of 4, which is equal to 2 . The horizontal dotted line indicates the 
value of ai of the corresponding basic MG with the same N, m and s. 
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Figure 5.2: The T-dependence of ai for m = 1. Other parameters are N 二 257 and 
s = 2. The dotted line indicates the value of a\ of the corresponding basic MG. 
Figure 5.3 shows the T-dependence of GI for other values of m. It is ob-
served that for m < 6, ai exhibits a periodic behaviour with T with the period 
of 2 . However for m > 6, this periodic behaviour vanishes. In general, 
for other N and s the periodic behaviour of ai vanishes when ^ ^ > This 
periodic behaviour is related to the so-called doubly-periodic feature in the 
attendance of basic MG in the small m regime. It has been found [32] that in 
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the small m regime, the overlap of the strategies between agents is apprecia-
ble. This leads to the crowd effect as discussed in Section 2.3.2. The crowd 
effect is caused by the collective behaviour of a group of agents in making 
decisions. This leads to a doubly-periodic behaviour in the history bit-string. 
The doubly-periodic behaviour can be qualitatively understood as follows. In 
the small m regime, the history space is relatively small. It is reasonable to 
assume that each of the 2爪 history bit-strings occurs with equal probability, 
(i) When a particular history string occurs, the agents choose the strategies 
with higher virtual points. As many agents use these strategies, they will all 
lose due to overcrowding. Therefore the virtual points will go to the strate-
gies' anti-correlated partners, thus lifting them to a higher rank, (ii) After 
about 2爪 time-steps the history string occurs again, this time many agents use 
those anti-correlated strateies, and again they will all lose due to overcrowding. 
Therefore no virtual points will go to those anti-correlated strategies, pulling 
it to a lower rank, (iii) After about another time-steps the same history 
string occurs once again, this time the agents' choices return to the original 
strategies which they have used 2 • 2饥 time-steps ago. Then the situation re-
turn to (i). Therefore after every 2 . 2爪 time-steps, we have the history string 
and the strategies' ranking both return to a similar situation, resulted in the 
doubly-periodic feature of the time series. 
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Figure 5.3: The T-dependence of ai for different m. Other parameters are N = 257 
and s = 2. The dotted lines indicate the values of cfi of the corresponding basic 
MG. The vertical line indicates the location of T = 2 . 
For the values of m under which ai shows periodic behaviour, we observe 
two features: (i) when T = 1, ai is at its absolute minimum, (ii) when T is 
less than any multiples of 2 . a i shows a relative maximum, and (iii) except 
for the first few values of T, the values of ai in M G { T } are always higher than 
that of the corresponding basic MG. 
For m> 6, the T-dependence of ai is no longer periodic. Figure 5.4 shows 
the results on an enlarged scale for m = 6 and m = 7. For m = 6, it is 
observed that ai increases slowly as T increases until T 二 2 . 2爪,after that 
(Ji converges very slowly to that of the basic MG. For m = 7, the value cri 
decreases monotonically with T and converges to that of the basic MG. For 
larger values of m the T-dependence of ai is similar to that of m = 7. 
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Figure 5.4: The T-dependence of ai for m 二 6 and m = 7. Other parameters are 
N = 257 and s = 2. The dotted lines indicate the values of ai in the corresponding 
basic MGs. 
(c) Compar i son between M G { T = 2 - 2 ^ } and t he basic M G 
We focus on the special cases of MG{T = 2-2^}. We compare M G { T = 2-2^} 
with the basic MG. The results of ai are shown in Fig.5.5. It is observed that 
for MG{T = 2 • 2爪}, although ai still approaches the coin-toss limit for large 
m, the minimum around ^ ^ c 1 disappears. The results around m 二 6 indi-
cate that the cooperation between agents making opposite decisions, i.e. the 
cancellation effect of crowd and anti-crowd, is suppressed in MG{T 二 2 • 2爪}. 
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Figure 5.5: The m-dependence of ai for different MG. Other parameters are N = 
257 and s = 2. 
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To study the performance of the agents, we compare the < rp/part./turn > 
of M G { T = 2 - 2 ^ } with the basic MG. The results are shown in Fig. 5.6. In 
general, the performance of the agents in the basic MG is better than that in 
MG{T = 2 • 2^} with the same memory size m. The reason is that for agents 
with a longer memory on their strategies' performance, the strategies' virtual 
points better reflect their performances and lead to better performance of the 
whole population as a whole. 
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Figure 5.6: A comparison of < rp/part./turn > in basic MG and MG{r = 2 • 2^}. 
Other parameters are N — 257 and s = 2. 
5.2 Mixed-population 
5.2.1 Model 
We are interested in a mixed population consisting of agents playing the basic 
MG and MG{T = 2-2^}. The alloy model is defined similar to that in Section 
4.2.1. The only difference is that all agents have Tmin = 0 here, and some of 
agents have T — C X D as in the basic MG and the rest have T = 2 . 2 讯 . 
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5.2.2 Results 
We take N = 256 and 5 = 2 and study the alloy game for different values 
of m. Figure 5.7 shows the results for m = 1. At the most left we have a 
pure basic MG, and from left to right we gradually replace the basic agents by 
agents with T = 2 • 2爪.We observe that even if half of the basic MG agents 
are replaced, the performance of the basic MG agents is not changed. The 
T = 2 • 2饥 agents can benefit and perform better than the basic agents for a 
large range of fraction of T = 2 • agents in the population. This results in a 
net gain in the performance of the whole population, denoted by the increasing 
solid line as the number of T = 2 • agents increases. Moreover, we note 
that in the presence of basic agents, the T = 2 • agents can do better than 
a pure T = 2 • population. When about | of the basic agents are replaced, 
the roles of the two parties become interchanged. The T 二 2 . 2讯 agents begin 
to dominate as the background population. The few basic agents adapt to the 
environment, i.e. history bit-striiig, mainly created by the T 二 2 . 2爪 agents 
very well and significantly oiit-pei loi m the T = 2- 2爪 agents. If there are fewer 
than 10 basic agents, their < yy^/part./turn > can even exceed 0.5. Finally, 
there exists an optimal composition for the population in which the overall 
performance of the whole population is the best. 
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Figure 5.7: The results of the alloyed MG for m = 1. Other parameters are N = 256 
and s = 2. The maximum of the solid line indicates the optimal composition for the 
population. 
Figure 5.8 shows the results for the other values of m. The three graphs 
in the left column correspond to small values of m, for which features similar 
to those in m = 1 are observed. However, as m increases, the two subgroups 
benefit less from each other, and the optimal composition contains more basic 
agents. The basic MG agents out-perform the T 二 2 . 2讯 agents for a large 
fraction of composition. The three graphs in the right column correspond to 
large values of m. For m > 8, the two subgroups do not affect the performance 
of each other. In other words, the interaction between the basic agents and the 
T = 2.2""^  agents vanishes. In this regime, the pool of strategies has become too 
large that either type of agents can take advantage of the presence of the other. 
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Figure 5.8: The results of the alloyed MG for different m. Other parameters are 
N = 256 and 5 = 2. 
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5.2.3 Discussions 
In this section we will try to understand the results by observing the bit-string 
statistics of the separated games, as in Section 4.2.2. Again we will consider 
the statistics of the bit-string with length k = m oi the pure games. 
basic MG MG{r=2(2讲)} 
m = k = 3 m = k = 3 
1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 . 8 - -D.8 - n -
_ 0.6 - -� .6 - n n n 
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-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Figure 5.9: The bit-string statistics for pure basic MG and pure MG{T = 2 • 2^} 
for fc = m = 3. Other parameters are N = 257 and 5 = 2. 
Figure 5.9 shows typical results in the small m regime, together with the 
results corresponding to the basic MG for comparison. The histograms for the 
pure basic MG are flat while that of the MG{T = 2 . 2爪} are not flat. In 
a mixed-population, if the agents with T 二 2 . 2讯 become dominant in the 
composition, the history of the game is essentially generated by them. From 
Fig. 5.9 we know that in this ease the history contains m-bit information so 
that the few basic agents can adapt to this information and out-perform the 
MG{T = 2 • 2"^} agents. This explains why in the small m regime, a few basic 
agents can take great advantage of the background population consisting of 
T = 2 • 2讯 agents, as indicated by the results in the left column of Fig. 5.8. 
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basic MG MG{r=2(2"')} 
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Figure 5.10: The bit-string statistics for pure basic MG and pure MG{T : 2 . 2^} 
for /c = m 二 8. Other parameters are N -— 257 and s 二 2. 
Figure 5.10 shows the corresponding results in the large m regime. The 
histograms for both pure games are not flat. We also observe that the fluc-
tuations of the two histograms are more or less the same. This implies that 
in the large m regime, the history strings created by the basic agents and by 
the T = 2 * 2讯 agents are indistingiisible, at least to any agents with the same 
memory m. As a result the two groups of agents with the same large memory 
m do not show any interactions, as observed in the results in the right column 
of Fig. 5.8. 
Chapter 6 
Minority game combining both 
modifications 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we introduced two modifications of the basic MG. In 
Chapter 4, the agents are allowed to quit the game temporarily. In Chapter 5, 
the agents consider the short term performance of their strategies. Obviously 
these two modifications are not exclusive. In this Chapter, we consider a 
combined version of the two modifications. 
In Section 6.1, we define our model. In Section 6.2, we present typical 
numerical results of the model, and explain some of the features. Comparison 
with previous models will be given where appropriate. 
6.1 Model 
First of all, the strategy pool and the parameters {TV，m, 5} are defined as 
those of the basic MG in Section 2.1. Then the success rate of a strategy 
r{t) is defined as in Eq. (5.1) with the parameter T introduced. Finally 
an agent can quit the game at the 力-th time-step if each of her s strategies 
has a r{t) lower than Tmin- So altogether this modified MG is characterized 
by five parameters {iV, m, s， r爪仏 T } . From now on we denote the present 
modification by T} . 
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Note that when T tends to infinity, MG{rmin,T} reduces to MG{rmin} 
in Chapter 4. When Tmin equals zero, reduces to M G { T } in 
Chapter 5. When both conditions are satisfied, M G { r 爪 ;几， T } reduces to the 
basic MG in Chapter 2. 
6.2 Results 
(a) T h e r^i几-dependence of 
In Chapter 4, we have studied for the r,^m-dependence of the time 
averaged number of participants < Natt >• We observed a sharp transition 
at Tmin = 0.5 at which < Natt > drops from iV to 0 (see Fig. 4.1). We are 
interested in whether it is still the case for MG{rmin, T}. Figure 6.1 shows the 
results for several values of T with the same TV, m and s. The results show 
that, with T introduced, < Natt > no longer shows a single sharp transition. 
Instead the single transition splits into a series of (T — 1) small transitions. 
The transitions are evenly separated such that the plot of < Natt > shows T 
steps of equal width. 
200 200 • 
A_ 
f 
100 • 100 • 
0 ‘ . i ~ • 丨 ^ 0 . . . . I . ~ . . . ~ ~ 
257 r = 2 - 257 — • ， r = 4 
200 • - 200 -
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0 I ‘ 1 0 I ‘ 
0.0 0,5 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 
‘min ^min 
Figure 6.1: The rmm-dependence of < Natt > in MG{rmin^T} for different values 
of T. Other parameters are N = 257, rn = 3, and 5 = 2. 
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Figure 6.2: The rmm-dependence of ai in MG {rmin, for different values of T. 
Other parameters are N — 257, m = ；]. and s = 2. 
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Figure 6.3: The r,ni,|-depeiidGncc> of�/-/^/part. /i urn > in 川 „ ， T } for different 
values of T. Other parameters arc A" 二 257. m 二 3. and .s 二 2. 
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We also studied the r^m-depenclence of …in MG{rv“几，T}. From Fig. 6.2, 
it is observed that cji takes on values falling onto different bands according to 
the steps in < N a t t � . In general ai is higher around rmin = 0.5, but it does 
not mean that the agents pla3dng with Tmin around 0.5 perform worse. To 
compare the performance of agents having different rmin values, we show the 
^mm-dependence of < rp/part./turn > in Fig. 6.3. The figure indicates that 
with the same value of T, the agents with smaller rmin always perform better. 
We have examined < Natt〉，and < rp/part./turn > for different values 
of N, m and s as well, and similar results are observed. We found that changing 
N, m and s only affect the heights of the steps but not the values of Tmin at 
which the transitions occur. 
Comparing Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 with Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, we observe that the 
plots of < Natt > and ai become quite different after T is introduced into 
MG{r—n}. However, the values of T we have considered so far are small. 
When T becomes larger, we expect that the model MG{7Viin,T} to approach 
To verify this, we studied large values of T. Results are shown in 
Figs. 6.4, 6.5, and 6 .6. These three figures show how the r^^m-dependence of 
approaches that of for large T. 
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Figure 6.4: The rviin-dependence of < Natt > in MG{rvnin,T} for larger values of 
T. Other parameters are N = 257, 'm 二 3, and 5 = 2. The corresponding results of 
MG{r爪iTi} are also shown. 
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Figure 6.6: The r爪in-dependence of < rp/part./turn > in M.G{rmin,T} for larger 
values of T. Other parameters are N = 257, m 二 3, and 5 = 2. The corresponding 
results of MG{r—n} are also shown. 
From the three figures we observe that as T becomes large, the steps before 
Tmin = 0.5 are gradually raised and they combine into one step, while the 
steps after Vmin = 0.5 gradually fall to zero. This makes the shapes of all 
the three graphs approach those of MG{7Vun}. However for ai (Fig. 6.5) 
and < rp/part./turn > (Fig. 6.6), the values within 0 < Tmin < 0.5 do not 
approach that of The reason is that for whatever values of T we 
use, the length of the game is always chosen to be longer than T. (Readers 
are referred to Section 5.1.2(a) for this convention.) Therefore those values 
of MG {rmin G [0, 0.5), T } do not approach that of MG{rmin — 0} exactly. 
Instead, just like the small m regime of MG{T} , the value always depends 
periodically with T. For instance, the values of ai within 0 < Tmin < 0.5 
for T = 50 can be deduced from Fig. 5.3. The behaviour of the values at 
Tmin = 0.5 do not belong to either sides. This case will be treated seperately 
in the next sub-section. 
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For small values of T, the series of T steps of equal width observed in Fig. 
6.1 for < Natt > as a function of rmin can be explained as follow. Consider 
T = 4 as an example. For T = 4, at each time-step the agents only keep the 
strategies' record up to the recent four time-steps. Therefore the amount of 
strategies' virtual points (vp) only involve five possible values, namely vp = 
0,1,2,3,4. So the strategies' success rates r also take on discrete values, and 
the allowed values of r are 0,0.25, 0.5, 0.75,1. When the value of r爪切 increases 
from 0 to 1 we can divide the range into five intervals: (i) Tmin — 0，(ii) 
0 < Tmin < 0.25, (iii) 0.25 < Trmn < 0.5, (IV) 0.5 < Tmin < 0.75, (V) 0.75 < 
Tmin ^ 1. The values of rmin within the same interval are effectively the same, 
leading to the same < Natt >• So except the single point in case (i), each of 
the other four intervals form a step in the plot of < Natt�against rmin- The 
above argument can be readily generalized to other values of T, as long as the 
steps can still be recognized. This accounts for the T steps of equal width for 
small values of T. 
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(b) T h e T-dependence of M G { r w = 0.5, T } 
Recall that the behaviour of M G { T } shows a periodic dependence on T with 
a period of 2 • 2爪 for ^ ^ < Here, we investigate if the same feature remains 
in MQ{rmin = 0.5, T } . Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 show that the periodic feature 
remains. 
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Figure 6.7: The T-dependence oi. < Natt > for different rn in MG{rmin — 0.5,T}. 
Other parameters are N = 257 and�‘ 二 ‘2. The dotted lines indicate the correspond-
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Figure 6.9: The T-dependence of < rp/part./turn > for different m in MG{rmin = 
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Prom Fig. 6.9, an interesting phenomenon is observed. It is found that 
when T has the form (T = n ( 2 . 2 爪 ) - 1 ) where n is any natural number, the 
corresponding values of < rp/part./turn > fall to nearly zero. This implies 
that in every time-step all participants rush into the same side and lose. Note 
that for these T, the difference between the values of T and the period of the 
time series is one. Therefore the agents fail to update their information based 
on a complete cycle, instead the missing information from the n(2-2"^)-th time-
step lead to an "illusion" that there always exists a best decision. To the agents 
it seems that all strategies with r > 0.5 would give them the same prediction. 
So for the agents who hold at least one of the r > 0.5 strategies, they would all 
go to the same room; but for the rest of them, the criterion rmin 二 0.5 always 
block them from entering the game. As a result all participants lose. 
From Fig. 6.7 - 6.9, it is observed that besides the periodic feature, the 
values oscillate within each period as well. This further seperates the data 
points into an even-T pattern and a nearby odd-T pattern. The two patterns 
seperate most in the results of < Natt > (Fig. 6.7). The results are sensitive 
to the odd/even of T because only for even T the strategies can have a success 
rate r{t) = 0.5 exactly, and such strategies are still allowed to be used. 
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We observed in the last chapter that in M G { T } , the periodic feature per-
sists only for values of m satisfying ^ ^ < It is reasonable to ask whether 
the same feature remains in MG {rmin 二 0.5’ From Fig. 6.10, the peri-
odic feature also disappears for rn = 7 for which ^ ^ > The odd/even T 
effect vanishes for ai, but remains clearly for < Natt > and < r p / p a r t . / t u r n � . 
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Figure 6.10: The T-dependence of gi and < rp/part./turn > for m = 7 in 
MG {rmin = 0.5, T}. Other parameters are N = 257 and s = 2. The dotted lines 
indicate the corresponding results of MG{rwn 二 0.5}. 
( c ) T h e m - d e p e n d e n c e o f M G { r 爪饥 = 0 . 5 , T - 2 • 2 ^ } 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we have taken r^m = 0.5 and T 二 2 • be special 
cases and studied them in detail. We know that for MG{rmin, T = 2 • 2"^}, 
Tmin = 0.5 is not the only transition in the number of participants. However, 
Figs. 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 show that all the steps would eventually vanish as 
T 二 2 .2爪 increases, except the feature at rmin = 0.5. Therefore we substitute 
both conditions, i.e., Tmin — 0.5 and T 二 2 . 2讯 into T} and study 
the corresponding m-dependent properties. 
First, we consider the probability distribution of the number of participants 
P{Natt) in Fig. 6.11. When compared it with that of MG {rmin 二 0.5} (see Fig. 
4.4), we found that the two peaks in the distributions combine more rapidly 
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as m increases, and the value of Natt at which P{Natt) is a maximum decreases 
much slower. In general more participants are left in the large-m games than 
in MG {rmin = 0.5} with the same value of m. 
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Figure 6.11: The probability distributions P(Natt) in MG{rmin = 0.5, T = 2 • 2爪}• 
Other parameters are N = 257 and 5 = 2. 
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Figure 6.12: The scatter plot of Natt{t) of MG{r爪；几=0.5, T = 2 - 2 ^ } for m = 1. 
Other parameters are N = 257 and 5 = 2. 
To study the time series of the number of participants Natt{t) in more detail, 
we treat Nattif + 1) as a map from Nattif)- In Fig. 6.12, we plot Natt{t + 1) 
against Natt{t) for m = 1. From Fig. 6.11, Natt[t) takes on values within two 
ranges centered around 190 and 240, respectively, plus the value 256. Then Fig. 
6.12 tells us the "transition" rules. For example, the patch at Nattif) « 190 
implies that if the value of TVaw � at any time-step is in the � 1 9 0 region, then 
the number of participants is in the � 2 4 0 region in the next time-step. From 
these rules we know that Nau(t + 1) is strongly correlated to Nattif). 
Figure 6.13 shows the same plot for other values of m. As m increases the 
patches merge together. In the large-m regime, another kind of correlation 
between Nau{t) and Nattit + 1) is observed in which it is quite likely to have 
Natt{t + 1) ^ AU⑴，although the range of Nattifij is not small. 
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Figure 6.13: The scatter plot of Natt{t) of MG{r 爪切=0.5, T = 2-2^} for different 
values of m. Other parameters are N = 257 and 5 = 2. 
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Figure 6.14 shows the m-dependence of < rp/part./turn > in MG{rmin — 
0.5, T = 2 • The results of the other three models are also shown for 
comparison. The < rp/part./turn > of MG{rmin = 0.5, T = 2 . still 
exhibits a maximum when ^ ^ � 1 is satisfied. In general the performance 
of MG{rViin = 0.5, T = 2 . 2^} agents (open triangles) is poorer than that 
of the basic MG agents (filled circles). However it is better than that of 
=： 0.5} agents (filled triangles), especially in the large-m regime. 
0,5 ！ ‘ ‘ I 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 ] 
0.4 “ - . … 、 、 
八 〜... 
§ 0.3 “ 
tf CO Q. 
> 0.2 ： 
V . \ ： 
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0.1 - G … G M G { r 二 2(2阳)} • � • • ： 
：•……MG{rmin = 0.5} …“ 
… A M G { r _ = 0 . 5 , r = 2 ( 2 m ) } 
Q ^ ‘ “ ‘ 1 1 1 1 I I I • ] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
m 
Figure 6.14: The m-dependence of < rp/part./turn > for different MG models. 
Other parameters are N = 257 and 5 = 2. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
We have studied three different variations on the Minority Game. In these 
variations the agents are modified while the definition of their strategies is 
preserved. The models were defined, numerical results were presented, and 
new features were discussed. Besides, the mixed-population games were also 
studied. 
In Chapter 4, we allowed the agents to quit the game temporarily, provided 
that their strategies' performance was not satisfactory. This was done by giving 
the strategies an acceptable success rate rmin- It is found that the mean total 
number of participants < Natt > exhibits an abrupt drop at rmin 二 0.5. For 
rmin < 0.5 all agents participate, while for r m i n � 0 . 5 all agents leave the 
game permanently. At Tmin = 0.5 the game has non-trivial results. We then 
confined our discussions to the case of r爪饥 二 0.5 in which the agents never 
use a strategy with success rate less than 0.5. We observed that for all N and 
s，if we increased the value of m，< Natt > begins to decrease drastically when 
W i � i , and eventually its value drops to nearly 1% of the total number 
of agents when 资 > 1. This can be explained if we consider the success 
rates of an anti-correlated pair of strategies. Moreover, we found that for all 
m introducing Tmin = 0.5 cannot make an average agent to win more real 
points. We also studied the mixed-population version of the model in which 
basic agents with r^in = 0 and agents with r^,^ = 0.5 compete in the same 
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game. Results show that in the small m regime, the two groups of agents do 
not show any interaction, while in the large m regime the rmin : 0.5 agents 
may benefit from the presence of basic agents with rmin 二 0. This can be 
explained in terms of the bit-string statistics of pure games corresponding to 
Tmin 二 0 and rmin = 0.5 with the same values of m. 
In Chapter 5, the agents' hindsight on their strategies' performance was 
confined to the most recent T turns. We observed that in the small m regime 
the standard derviation ai of the attendance shows a periodic dependence on 
T with the period 2 . T h e reason is that the time series of the outcomes in 
MG has a periodic dynamics of the same period in the efficient phase. In the 
large m regime the periodicity vanishes, and ai decreases monotonically with 
T and approaches that of the basic MG. For the periodic case the value of ai 
at T = 2 . 2爪 is low. We then confined our discussions to the special case of 
T = 2.2爪，and investigated its m-dependence. We found that the minimun of 
cTi around ^ � 1 disappears. We also studied the mixed-population version 
of the game. When m is small the basic agents and the agents using T = 2 • 2肌 
show a large interaction. The two groups benefit each other, leading to a net 
gain of the whole population. When m increases the interaction between the 
two groups vanishes. Such observations can also be explained in terms of the 
bit-string statistics. 
In Chapter 6, the two modifications discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 were 
combined. We considered MG{r , ,^ } plus T and observed that the single large 
transition of < Natt > splits into a series of T small transitions. The spliting of 
transition is due to the discrete values of the strategies' success rates for small 
T. For M G { T } plus rmin = 0.5, we observed that the periodic T-dependence 
is preserved, but within each period the behaviour is sensitive to whether T is 
odd or even. For basic MG plus r •几 = 0 . 5 and T = 2 . 2爪,we observed that 
the performance of the agents is not improved. 
Finally，we give a few comments on the modifications. When we impose an 
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acceptable success rate r 她 to the agents, we hope that it could prevent the 
agents with poor strategies to enter the game. We expected this may reduce 
the number of losers in each turn and lead to a better average performance 
of the population. However it is found not to be the case. It is because (i) 
the distribution of the strategies' success rate is concentrated sharply around 
0.5, making the "filtering" effect of rmin very inefficient; and (2) the ranking 
of the performance of the strategies is constantly changing. In addition, by 
cutting out the poorly performing agents in a turn, the better performing 
agents maintain the crowd effects as observed in the basic MG. As the agents 
not taking part in the game also adapt to the outcome in the turns that they 
do not play, the dynamics of the MG that follows from the crowd effects is 
retained. The agents cannot suppress the crowd effects by staying out of the 
game. It is, therefore, worth considering other schemes of letting the agents 
stay out of the game temporarily. For the mixed-population versions of MG, 
the interaction between the T = 2 • agents and the basic MG agents gives 
the interesting phenomenon that enhanced performance of one group does not 
neccessarily hurts the other group in a competing population. It worths further 
investigating this kind of mixed-population in which agents of diversified ability 
are involved. 
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